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Indonesia is set to implement regulation aimed at improving online content moderation that is 
potentially problematic for both users and private electronic system organizers (ESOs) through 
the Ministry of Communications and Informatics (MOCI) Regulation No. 5/2020 on Electronic 
System Organizers in the Private Sector. This regulation requires that ESOs remove or block 
content at MOCI’s behest within a strict time span—24 hours for non-urgent content and four 
hours for urgent content.
The lack of due process for ESOs trying to meet their obligations when they receive takedown 
requests from MOCI is exacerbated by a loose definition of “prohibited content.” The regulation 
creates a risk of unaccountable over-enforcement that violates individuals’ freedom of expression 
in the digital space.
While websites need content moderation, the timeframes set by MOCI make it impossible for 
private ESOs to properly assess takedown requests before carrying them out. This creates a 
dilemma for private ESOs—they can quickly and without proper evaluation take down the 
content, in which case they risk being accused of violating individual rights, or they can refuse 
the request, which could lead to access blocking by the MOCI. 
These problems illustrate why MOCI must adopt a co-regulation approach and involve private 
ESOs in the development of implementation guidelines. These guidelines should include due 
process for content removal orders by the government that includes an appeal mechanism, a 
reasonable timeframe for compliance, and immunity rights from damage that may arise from 
users’ posts in platforms for ESOs that have met their obligations under MOCI Regulation No. 
5/2020.        
A crucial missing piece from MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 is a procedure for platforms to object 
to content removal requests. The establishment of an independent oversight board chaired by 
representatives from the government, private ESOs, and civil society organizations to resolve 
disputes over content moderation should be considered to ensure that moderation is conducted 
while balancing concerns about freedom of speech.      
MOCI should refrain from defining content moderation merely as ‘content removal’ from online 
platforms and instead allow for a broader definition of the term. Rather than leaving private 
ESOs with two extreme choices—remove or keep—over the allegedly prohibited content, MOCI 
Regulation No. 5/2020 needs to acknowledge that actions such as demoting, downranking, 
demonetizing, content labelling, limiting access, and warnings for users about possibly sensitive 
and harmful posts, are already-existing mechanisms that help keep the internet safe and usable. 
These mechanisms should be included as content moderation actions by the regulation.
Adopting a co-regulation approach to develop a due process for content moderation and allowing 
a broader set of actions by ESOs in response to removal requests would facilitate a more balanced 
approach to internet safety and freedom of speech.
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CONTENT MODERATION LANDSCAPE
Internet use is growing quickly everywhere in the world and Indonesia is no exception. Almost 
50% of the Indonesian population are internet users who use digital platforms ranging 
from social media, digital marketplaces, knowledge sharing, and entertainment offered by 
electronic systems providers (Statistics Indonesia, 2020). Indonesian laws, including Ministry of 
Communications and Informatics (MOCI) Regulation No. 5/2020—the focus of this policy paper, 
refer to these providers as electronic system organizers (ESOs). MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 
defines ESOs as any person, state or business entity, or community that provides, manages, and/
or operates electronic systems individually or collectively for their users, for their interests, or 
the interest of other parties. This definition is all-encompassing and includes all sizes of private 
online platforms operating domestically or from overseas.
Information exchange between users is continuous and fast-paced, especially on user-generated 
content (UGC) platforms or intermediaries that rely on electronic contents created by their users 
in their platforms. MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 describes that these contents include but are not 
limited to writing, sound, images, maps, designs, photos, electronic data interchange, electronic 
mail, telegram, telex, telecopy, letters, access codes, symbols.
Social media is one example of a UGC platform with a vast and continuous digital information 
flow of UGC. Every minute, there were 41 million WhatsApp messages shared, 300 
thousand Instagram stories uploaded, and 300 thousand messages and images 
posted on Facebook worldwide in 2020 (Statista, 2020).  
Statistics Indonesia’s (2019) data show that social media is a reason to access 
the internet for 87% of Indonesian internet users. As of January 2021, 170 million 
Indonesians, roughly half of the country’s total population, are social media users 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2021; We Are Social & Hootsuite, 2021). Among Indonesian 
adults, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter are the most popular, 
used by 94%, 88%, 87%, 86%, and 64% of adult internet users in Indonesia, respectively 
(We Are Social & Hootsuite, 2021).
The Need for Content Moderation
The type of content posted varies greatly and carries different consequences. Along with benefits 
from content that can be educational, informative, enriching and free, internet users can also find 
pornographic, hateful, violent, abusive, and obscene content that can have serious personal and 
social costs.
The risk is even bigger for UGC platforms, where users’ posts are at the heart of their business 
model. While they may help create “networked publics” (Gillespie, 2018), they may also be 
prone to online harassment, bullying, revenge pornography, and other damaging misuse of 
their platforms. A mechanism is needed to decide what stays online and what gets taken down. 
This is known as content moderation (Barret, 2020). Many social media platforms practice self-
regulation by developing their own community standards and censoring posts that fail to meet 
them.
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While weak content moderation comes with a risk of harmful material, excessive content 
moderation may turn into excessive censorship that could violate individual freedom of 
expression. Over-enforcement of content moderation could balloon into restriction of public 
opinion. MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 attempts to regulate content moderation in a way that falls 
between these extremes, but its problematic enforcement mechanism means that it errs on the 
side of violating freedom of expression.1  
The enforcement of MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 has been delayed by the passage of MOCI 
Regulation No. 10/2021. This paper aims to address some of the issues from both the private ESOs 
and the users and suggest improvements to the regulation before it becomes fully enforceable.
Content Moderation and Freedom of Speech: A Global Debate
The discourse of liberation versus restriction and where to draw a line between them in internet 
censorship is the subject of a global debate. This debate surrounds questions of how content 
moderation should balance protecting freedom of speech and maintaining safe online activity 
and of what roles digital platforms should play.
In many countries, there is growing demand from internet users and civil 
society organizations for improved protection for users from harmful online 
content (Vogels, 2021; Lomba et al., 2021). However, to what extent platforms 
should be held responsible for the material on their sites varies widely across 
different jurisdictions.
Section 230 of the United States Communication Decency Act, for example, 
guarantees immunity for platforms from liability for any published information 
or content by third-party users. While some welcome this for the freedom that 
it allows internet users who are developing content and applications, others 
worry that the network effects, especially in social media, accelerate the spread of harmful 
content, such as misinformation (Kerry, 2021).
The polar opposite is the onerous content restrictions in China. China is well-known for banning 
both domestic and foreign digital platforms that fail to comply with its censorship requirements, 
including blocking politically sensitive content. Even a tech giant like Apple has been forced to 
remove up to 55,000 applications from the App Store since 2017 in order to access Chinese 
consumers (Caster, 2021)
1 It should be noted that there are other concerns over MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020, particularly regarding data governance, but 
this policy paper exclusively looks at its content moderation provisions and how the lack of due process therein may be damaging 
to the users and the private ESOs in Indonesia.
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Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), though not as restrictive as China, also requires 
social networks with more than 2 million users to take down illegal content within a restricted 
time and imposes heavy fines for noncompliance (De Streel, et al., 2020). A recent reform in the 
federal parliament is reported to have added a responsibility for social networks to file reports to 
the federal police for criminal content on their platform (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).
According to SAFEnet (2021a), Indonesia’s content moderation under MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 
reflects the approach of NetzDG, especially in the strict time span to comply with takedown 
requests and the strong concentration of power in the MOCI.
Content Moderation Debate in Indonesia
Though content moderation enforcement has only recently gained special attention from 
platforms and the public in Indonesia, debates about internet censorship have been ongoing 
for at least a decade. For example, many expressed concern over the use of Law No. 11/2008 
on Electronic Information and Transaction and its 2016 revision (EIT Law) to repress political 
views and beliefs. Access termination and internet shutdown by the government on the grounds 
of preventing misinformation were often met with pushbacks from the 
public. The judiciary branch has even ruled unlawful the controversial 
internet access shutdown in Papua by the government in 2019 (Adjie, 
2020).
Rather than reconsidering state involvement in the digital space, MOCI 
Regulation No. 5/2020 reemphasizes MOCI’s central role in Indonesia’s 
digital governance by establishing MOCI’s authority to request that 
private ESOs take down prohibited content with limited due process and 
no appeal mechanism. 
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 mandates that all ESOs comply with takedown requests by MOCI 
within a restricted time period—24 hours for non-urgent prohibited content, and four hours for 
urgent prohibited content. This makes it difficult for the ESOs to comprehensively check the 
reported content, especially when the regulation gives no room for the private ESOs to express 
disagreement with the requests. For UGC platforms, this obligation is in addition to operating 
their own content moderation mechanisms.
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THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF DUE PROCESS IN 
MOCI REGULATION  NO.5/2020 ON USERS’ 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Content Moderation Under MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 is an implementing regulation derived from Government Regulation 
(GR) No. 71/2019 on the Implementation of Electronic Systems and Transaction, which specifically 
governs private ESOs. MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 mandates all types of private ESOs, regardless 
of their size, to keep their platforms free from prohibited content—defined as content that 
violates existing legislation, content that disturbs public order, or content that provides access 
to prohibited content. The public, courts, legal officers, and government agencies can file reports 
of prohibited content to MOCI. MOCI then verifies whether the content is prohibited and passes 
on takedown requests to the ESOs. Upon receiving the request from MOCI, an ESO has up to 24 
hours to take down content deemed non-urgent, or four hours for content deemed urgent. Urgent 
content includes materials related to terrorism, child pornography, and content that creates a 
public disturbance or disrupts public order.
In addition to this, operators of UGC platforms must develop their own reporting mechanism 
whereby the public can actively participate in spotting and reporting prohibited content. Upon 
receiving a report, the ESOs must verify them and decide whether the materials are violating the 
standards set by the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 as well as the platform’s community guidelines.
The Concentration of Power in the Government and the 
Lack of Due Process
In the broadest sense, due process can be understood as a procedural protection to ensure 
fairness and protection of private rights in a particular action (Garner, 2004). In a legal context, 
it is often used to emphasize that the procedure through which a judgment is made must be 
consistent, fair, independent, and transparent (Knoepfel, 2019, p.4). While MOCI Regulation No. 
5/2020 outlines the expected content moderation action by private ESOs, particularly in response 
to MOCI takedown requests, the regulation contains limited due process and accountability 
provisions. 
In the context of takedown requests by MOCI, due process should mean granting ESOs and internet 
users a fair mechanism to protest, challenge, and/or question the requests. Unfortunately, the 
regulation is not equipped with provisions for appeal mechanisms or even transparency reports 
over the removal of content. Instead, it pushes for private ESOs to be responsive towards both 
the general public and government’s requests under strict time limits without room to express 
disagreement. Without due process, content moderation risks becoming an unchecked, top-down 
mechanism that may violate the users’ freedom of expression.
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Responding to that situation, a co-regulation approach could play an 
important role. Co-regulation gives room for risk-sharing responsibility. 
That refers to the distribution of roles and responsibility between the 
government and the ESOs in governing the digital space to minimize the 
risk created by harmful content as well as violation of users’ freedom of 
speech.
Co-regulation can also become the avenue for knowledge sharing 
pertaining to the types of prohibited content spread across online platforms. Finally, co-regulation 
will create a more adaptable online regulatory environment because it allows for continuous 
evaluation and feedback from both the MOCI’s and the ESOs’ ends.
 
Challenges in Defining “Prohibited Content” Underscores 
the Need for Due Process
The lack of due process becomes even more problematic in light of the vague definition of 
prohibited content in MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020. Prohibited content, per this regulation, is (1) 
in violation of laws and regulations, (2) creates a public disturbance and disrupts public order, 
and (3) posts or provides access to prohibited content (Article 9(4)b). Uncertainties arise in areas 
such as who gets to decide if content disrupts public order, the difference between urgent and 
non-urgent content, or how the public and ESOs interpret this phrase.
Article 9 (5) stresses that government ministries or agencies determine whether content is 
creating a public disturbance and disrupting public order based on existing laws and regulations. 
Only a limited role is left for ESOs in interpreting these loosely defined terms. Some fear that 
concentration of power in the executive branch could put at risk users’ freedom of speech 
(SAFEnet, 2021b). When the power to prohibit content is heavily invested in government bodies, 
a lack of due process provisions for the public and ESOs to fight for their rights undermines the 
implementation of fair and democratic content moderation. 
Defining prohibited content has never been an easy task, nor is it unique to Indonesia. The sheer 
volume and variety of internet content, combined with the many perceptions of what content 
causes harm, makes it impossible to neatly categorize content according to a rigid and broadly 
accepted definition. Vague classification of prohibited content may be misused to execute and 
justify political oppression, persecution, and to limit freedom of expression.
But problems that arise from too broad a definition do not imply that a 
narrowed definition is a panacea. Overly granular definition of prohibited 
content leaves little room to consider context and may merely arrive 
through a different avenue at equally repressive provisions. Myanmar’s 
attempts to provide a specific definition has resulted in excessive bans 
on subjective content seen as “destroying unity” or “inappropriate to 
Myanmar’s culture” (Panday, 2021). 
Because content moderation is inherently subjective (Singh, 2019), 
even if lawmakers attempt to make the definition more detailed and objective, the moderator’s 
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subjective judgement will always be used to apply the definition to potentially prohibited content. 
India has tried to flesh out its definition of forbidden content through the IT Guidelines for 
Intermediaries and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules 2021 (IT Rules 2021), but still ends up with 
phrases such as “creating material risk of harm to sovereignty, integrity, state security, or public 
order” that need subjective interpretation by moderators to be applied (Rodriguez et al., 2021).
In Indonesia, similar concerns have been expressed with regards to Government Regulation (GR) 
No. 71/2019 on Implementation of Electronic Transactions and Systems and MOCI Regulation 
No.5/2020, except they apply to a much wider base. If Germany’s NetzDG and India’s IT Rules 
2021 limit application to platforms that meet certain thresholds, Indonesian content moderation 
applies to all sizes of online platforms via the all-encompassing ESOs definition. This means 
that content moderation using a vague definition and applied with lack of due process affects the 
widest digital range.
Since objective definitions with clear-cut application are impossible, MOCI must guarantee that 
content moderation enforcement relies on due process and rules that create accountability 
among regulators and regulated alike, protecting freedom of expression.
Increasing Global Demand for Due Process in Content 
Moderation 
Indonesia diverges from the global norm of including an appeal mechanism in content moderation 
undertakings by failing to include one in MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020.
There are several policy trajectories worth to be considered by MOCI in this context. The UK 
government is drafting an Online Safety Bill which includes provision on appeal mechanisms 
for unfair content removal (Beck-Watt, 2021; Wessing, 2021). In addition, Canadian academics, 
for example, have included a Moderation Standards Council meant to oversee moderation 
actions, facilitate appeal requests, and improve transparency to the public as one of their 
recommendations to the Canadian government (De Streel et al., 2020). Rather than appointing 
itself as an implementing and supervising institution in content moderation, MOCI could consider 
introducing such a council to improve the independence and accountability of content moderation 
governance in the country.
In addition to an appeal mechanism, transparency reporting has become part of the accountability 
mechanism in Malaysia, UK, France, and Germany (UK Ministry of State for Digital and Culture, 
2020; Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, 2021; De Streel et al., 2020). 
Transparency reporting refers to the issuance of reports that explain content moderation actions, 
including the reasons behind the decisions. The reports are issued by the moderator—the 
government and the ESOs—and are made available to the public.
In MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020, transparency reporting is not required by the ESOs or MOCI. 
However, some ESOs, like Facebook and Google, voluntarily publish their own reports (Facebook 
Transparency, 2020; Google, 2021). MOCI has also followed this step by including “actions on 
negative contents” in its annual reports, though it does not include details such as the reasoning 
behind MOCI’s decision, who was involved in the process, how the mechanisms work, or analysis 
of the context.
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Limited Content Moderation Action
The loose definition plus the lack of clear-cut accountability mechanisms in the regulation creates 
a risk of over-enforcement, especially because MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 almost explicitly 
limits its interpretation of content moderation to content removal.
Limiting the regulatory conception of content moderation to 
content removal is problematic. Takedown requests from MOCI 
leaves only two extreme choices—to delete or to keep the 
reported content. 
Limiting the regulatory conception of content moderation to content removal is problematic. 
Takedown requests from MOCI leaves only two extreme choices—to delete or to keep the 
reported content. While the deleting may lead to an infringement of freedom of speech, keeping 
the content exposes the ESOs to sanctions from MOCI. Delete-or-keep is a rather stunted 
approach. In practice, UGC platform giants like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube use a range of 
options, including depublishing, demoting, downranking, demonetizing, and warning users about 
potentially sensitive and harmful posts. This is useful to mitigate the risk of the platform going 
into either extreme. Also, applying graduated sanctions based on the severity of the violations 
may help to see if the culprits are willing to correct their behavior without platforms risking a 
violation of freedom of speech.
Content moderation actions adopted by UGC platforms giants like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube 
warn users about potentially sensitive content, require users to log in for age verification prior to 
accessing certain materials, or flag content with potentially disputed status. For example, Twitter 
decided to flag and mark disputed claims in the 2020 U.S election rather than performing a mass 
takedown of tweets in its platform. These proven tools should be considered options beyond 
takedown requests that can be incorporated into MOCI regulatory policy. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF DUE PROCESS IN 
MOCI REGULATION NO. 5/2020 ON CONTENT 
MODERATION MECHANISM FOR ESOS
ESOs’ Dilemma in Responding to MOCI’s Takedown 
Requests Within a Restricted Time Span
The lack of due process, narrowly defined content moderation actions, and vague definition of 
prohibited content creates challenges for ESOs. Since ESOs are only given 24 hours to remove 
non-urgent materials and four hours to remove urgent content, a proper assessment of any report 
that results in a takedown request is likely infeasible. This is especially true when materials are 
reported based on the qualitative grounds of causing a public disturbance or disrupting public 
order, which are difficult to measure. This limits ESOs to two equally difficult options—to hastily 
take down the content, potentially being accused of violating individual rights, or to dismiss 
MOCI’s request and face up to three administrative fines before their internet access is blocked 
(Article 9 (6), Article 15 (7), Article 15 (12).
The four or 24 hour timeline for takedowns is amongst the most stringent timelines globally. Even 
Germany’s NetzDG, which is often considered as the prototype for excessive state censorship, 
allows 24 hours to seven days for the ESOs to assess, verify, and decide on their actions after 
receiving a request (Setiawan, 2021). 
Similarly, the EU’s E-commerce Directive, a foundational legal framework for internet services 
in the EU, doesn’t require legislators in each member state to establish a specific time period. 
The rationale behind this is to uphold the principle of proportionality and reasonable decision-
making that allow for flexibility in justified situations (De Streel et al., 2020). A strict time frame 
to comply threatens to create a “disproportionate burden on online platforms” and may risk 
encouraging over-enforcement that infringes on freedom of expression (De Street et al., 2020, p. 
91)—concerns that are also relevant in Indonesia’s case.
Action against allegedly prohibited content must take into account context, its potential impact 
on society, the size of the platform, and the nature of the service (De Streel, et al., 2020, p. 9). 
Seemingly similar content may have different effects depending on their context, intention, 
and where they are posted. There is also a global trend, especially strong in the EU, toward 
encouraging user participation in the notice-and-takedown system as opposed to relying on 
government requests (De Streel, et al., 2020). 
Action against allegedly prohibited content must take into account 
context, its potential impact on society, the size of the platform, 
and the nature of the service. 
France’s Constitutional Council declared unconstitutional several provisions in the Avia Law, a 
bill targeting online hate speech that made the French government the authority for content 
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moderation. When the court struck these provisions down, authority for content moderation was 
returned to the platforms. The Council also stresses that it is up to the platforms to assess 
contents in their networks to allow for a more context-based judgment (Mchangama, 2021).
User Generated Content Platform Liability Under 
Self-initiated Content Moderation
The liability of private ESOs for content posted on their platforms, especially in the case of UGC 
platforms, is also an issue. The mandate for the UGC platforms to perform self-initiated content 
moderation comes with burdensome punishments for non-compliance—fines, access blocking 
(Article 10(5)) and holding them liable for hosting prohibited content (Article 11)—but with few 
rewards. 
Article 11 of MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 provides little reassurance for UGC platforms even 
if they manage to remove prohibited content. The article states that UGC ESOs that have 
undertaken self-initiated content moderation, including taking down prohibited content, “may 
be exempted” (dapat dibebaskan) from legal liability for hosting prohibited content. The phrase 
“may be” suggests that there is no guarantee that ESOs protect themselves through compliance.
Strengthening the Safe Harbor for ESOs to Strengthen 
Public-Private Collaboration
Providing a full safe harbor for online platforms—that is, protection from legal liability when 
certain conditions are fulfilled—plays a central role in successful content moderation, especially 
when MOCI has limited control over content on ESOs’ platforms. While it is reasonable to expect 
online platforms to prevent the spread of harmful content that is under their control, there should 
be legal protection for platforms that have managed to do this. Japan’s Provider Liability Law, 
India’s Information Technology (IT) Act, and Cambodia’s Law on E-Commerce all require ESOs to, 
where possible, prevent the distribution of harmful content on their platforms and reward those 
that do with full legal safe harbor (Provider Liability Law, 2001; IT Act, 2000; Law on E-Commerce, 
2020).
MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 should therefore provide full safe harbor to ESOs by amending the 
phrase “may be exempted” (dapat dibebaskan) in Article 11 to “will be exempted” (akan dibebaskan) 
when referring to UGC ESOs that successfully self-initiated their content moderation.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Provisions in MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 could violate users’ freedom of speech due to the 
absence of due process,  which is exacerbated by the vague definition of prohibited content and 
the narrow interpretation of what constitutes content moderation. Several policy changes would 
improve the regulation to ensure fair content moderation that protects users from harm as well 
as their freedom of expression:
MOCI should adopt a co-regulation approach
MOCI should engage with the private ESOs, civil society organizations, and other relevant 
stakeholders in the decision making process and attempt to adopt a regulatory approach that 
stresses shared responsibility for policy creation, implementation, and enforcement—also 
known as co-regulation (Aprilianti & Dina, 2021). This approach would help MOCI amend the 
provisions in MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 and develop a content moderation guideline based on 
responsibility- and risk-sharing perspective.
Using the co-regulation approach, MOCI needs to amend several articles and accommodate the 
following:
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 should widen its interpretation 
on content moderation to give moderators more tools than 
merely content removal
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 almost explicitly limits content moderation to the removal of content 
from platforms. Content moderation should be understood more broadly as actions that limit 
the spread of content, including depublishing, demoting, downranking, and demonetizing, and 
warnings for users about possibly sensitive and harmful posts.
When content moderation is limited to content deletion, MOCI and ESOs are both more likely to 
violate freedom of expression. MOCI should allow private ESOs to use more tools to prevent the 
spread of harmful content while better balancing concerns about free expression.
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 should grant immunity to ESOs 
that have met their obligations under the regulation
MOCI should grant legal immunity for UGC ESOs that have performed content moderation in line 
with MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020. The term “may be exempted from legal liabilities” in the Article 
11 needs to be amended into “will be exempted from legal liabilities” when referring to the UGC 
ESOs that have performed their obligations. 
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MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 should include due process 
for ESOs and users, a reasonable time span for ESOs to 
comply, and an appeal mechanism
Rather than an environment of legal uncertainty and arbitrary decision making, MOCI Regulation 
No. 5/2020 should establish a due process for content moderation that allows ESOs and users 
to express their disagreement with MOCI’s content removal requests and ensures that content 
moderation is transparent, independent, and fair. 
MOCI should develop an appeal mechanism that allows ESOs and users to contest MOCI’s 
takedown requests. This is to ensure that takedown requests  are appropriately assessed within 
the corridor of freedom of expression principles. As a part of this, establishing an independent 
oversight board that includes representatives from MOCI, private ESOs and civil society to resolve 
interpretation disputes over the contents is also worth considering. 
The timeframe in which ESOs are expected to comply with a MOCI takedown order should be 
made flexible with proportionate measures. Action against allegedly prohibited content must 
take into account context, the potential impact of the content on society, the size of the platform, 
and the nature of the service. More time is required for ESOs to comprehensively assess these 
factors against their community standards and relevant laws and regulations before they can 
appropriately act on them. 
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